The noncommutative Polly Cracker cryptosystems were developed by T.Rai in his Ph.D. dissertation ([1]), and rely on the fact that there are ideals of noncommutative algebras over finite fields that have infinite reduced Groebner bases. First let us briefly present notations that will be used further in the text. Everything in this section is based on [1].We will be working with a noncommutative algebra F q < X >, where X = {x 1 , . . . , x n }, which is an algebra of noncommutative polynomials. By a monomial, we mean a finite noncommutative word in the alphabet X. We use the letter B to denote the set of monomials. We define multiplication in the set B of monomials by concatenation. The next important thing is the notion of an admissible ordering. A well-ordering > on B is said to be admissible if it satisfies the following conditions for all p, q, r, s ∈ B:
Noncommutative Polly Cracker and preliminaries from noncommutative algebra
The noncommutative Polly Cracker cryptosystems were developed by T.Rai in his Ph.D. dissertation ( [1] ), and rely on the fact that there are ideals of noncommutative algebras over finite fields that have infinite reduced Groebner bases. First let us briefly present notations that will be used further in the text. Everything in this section is based on [1] .We will be working with a noncommutative algebra F q < X >, where X = {x 1 , . . . , x n }, which is an algebra of noncommutative polynomials. By a monomial, we mean a finite noncommutative word in the alphabet X. We use the letter B to denote the set of monomials. We define multiplication in the set B of monomials by concatenation. The next important thing is the notion of an admissible ordering. A well-ordering > on B is said to be admissible if it satisfies the following conditions for all p, q, r, s ∈ B:
• if p < q then pr < qr;
• if p < q then sp < sq ;
• if p = qr then p > q and p > r.
Let > be an admissible ordering on the monomials and f ∈ F q < X >. We say that a monomial b i occurs in f if the coefficient of
Another thing we need is the notion of division of a polynomial g ∈ F q < X > by polynomials f 1 , . . . , f k ∈ F q < X >. To perform such a division means to find nonnegative integers t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t k and elements u ij , v ij , r ∈ F q < X >, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ t i such that:
for all i and j;
• tip(f i ) does not divide any monomial that occurs in r, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Note that if r = 0, then tip(r) ≤ tip(g); r is the remainder of the division.
On notions of a Groebner basis in noncommutative case cf. [1] . Now we present the noncommutative Polly Cracker from [1] . It can be summarized as follows.
Private Key: A Groebner basis, G = {g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g t } for a two-sided ideal, I, of a noncommutative algebra F q < X > over a finite field of q elements.
Public Key: A set, B = {q r :
⊆ I, chosen so that computing a Groebner basis of < B > is infeasible.
Message Space: M = N onT ip(I) or a subset of N onT ip(I). Encryption: c = p+m, where m ∈ M is a message and p =
Decryption: Reduction of c modulo G yields the message, m.
Note that for practical reasons T.Rai proposes to use G containing only one element g.
Cryptanalysis of noncommutative Polly Cracker
In [3] and [4] it was shown that (commutative) Polly Cracker (first proposed in [2] ) and its various modifications are susceptible to chosen ciphertext attacks. We will now show that noncommutative Polly Cracker is also susceptible to a chosen-ciphertext attack. In fact, we will only need one "fake" ciphertext in order to be able to decrypt all further ciphertexts correctly. In the following we assume that we know the form of g (e.g. g = αxy + βx + γy + δ, where α, β, γ, δ ∈ F q , cf. for example section 5.1.3 of [1] ).
The main idea relies on the following observation. Let I =< g >, and consider tip(g). We have:
where tail(g) = g − Ctip(g) · tip(g). Note, that tip(g) does not divide any monomial in tail(g). This means that −Ctip(g) −1 · tail(g) is the remainder of division of tip(g) by g, or equivalently, it is the result of decryption of the "fake" ciphertext tip(g). Now, let us go on to the chosen-ciphertext attack itself. Let us construct a "fake" ciphertext c ′ = t · tip(g) · s + F ij q i H ij , where t, s ∈ F q < X > are such that any monomial of t · tail(g) · s is not divisible by tip(g). Polynomials t and s are chosen for masking the "fake" ciphertext and, in principle, can be dropped out. We have:
and using this latter assumption we obtain that −Ctip(g) −1 t · tail(g) · s is the remainder of division of t · tip(g) · s by g, and thus this is the remainder of division of c ′ by g (as F ij q i H ij reduces to 0 modulo G = {g}).
A next simple example shows that requirements on t and s can be easily satisfied. For instance, let us take g = x 1 ·. . .·x 6 +c 1 x 1 +. . .+c 6 x 6 +c 0 , c 0 , . . . , c 6 ∈ F q \ {0} as in section 5.1.2 of [1] . Then tail(g) = c 1 x 1 + . . . + c 6 x 6 + c 0 (under any admissible ordering) and we can take t := x 2 x 4 + x 2 x 3 x 6 + x 4 x 1 x 5 ; s := x 5 x 1 x 3 + x 6 x 2 x 4 . One easily sees that no monomial of t · tail(g) · s is divisible by tip(g) = x 1 · . . . · x 6 . It is also clear that many more variants of t and s can be proposed.
So, going back to our construction we see that if we send a "ciphertext" c ′ , we obtain a "plaintext"
We know t and s, so we can easily deduce −Ctip(g)
where r is again the remainder, and it coincides with the remainder of division of c by the initial g.
For even more confusion for decrypting system we may send "fake" ciphertext of the form c ′′ = c ′ + h, where c ′ is as above, and h ∈ F q < X >, such that tip(g) does not divide any monomial in h. Note that such polynomials h "incorporate" monomials from N onT ip(I), i.e. valid messages. A "plaintext" corresponding to c ′′ will be p ′ + h, which again gives rise to g ′ as above. So, in our attack the "fake" ciphertext c ′′ contains either monomials divisible by tip(g) and non-divisible. In addition, we note that the variety of such c ′′ 's is very broad.
All considerations above imply that using private G = {g} can be claimed as insecure. Note that right from the definition of a reduced Groebner basis we get that also private keys of the form G = {g 1 , . . . , g s }, where G is the reduced Groebner basis for I are also can be claimed as insecure, because we can apply out technique s times in order to be able to correctly decrypt valid ciphertexts. So, at this point only private keys of the form G = {g 1 , . . . , g s }, where G is not reduced Groebner basis for I, and s > 1, can give a hope on constructing a system not susceptible to chosen-ciphertext attacks.
As a final remark we would like to note that the same principle can be applied when cryptanalyzing the generalized (commutative) Polly Cracker cryptosystems (cf. section 2.1, [1] ).
Conclusion
In this short note we have shown that newly proposed noncommutative Polly Cracker cryptosystem as it was worked through in [1] is susceptible to a chosenciphertext attack. This conceptually coincides with warnings stated in [4] as to using polynomial-based cryptosystems, and shows that more care should be put, when constructing such a system.
